We often take for granted various workplace safety laws that have been put in place by the federal, state and local governments to prevent and compensate us for workplace injuries and death. It wasn't all that long ago that a safe work environment was not exactly the norm. From the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which oversees safe working conditions to prevent workplace injuries, to our workers' compensation system that typically provide workers with pay to cover lost wages and medical bills, we are lucky to have these protections in place.
I was reminded of this fact when I read this blog post about Sherpas in Nepal. According to the post and the article it cites, being a Sherpa is the most dangerous service job in the world. This is another reminder that, despite how we typically feel about work, we don't have it so badly.
Wednesday, July 31, 2013
Tuesday, July 23, 2013
Is The Big Law Firm On Its Way Out?
While not directly related to Minnesota Employment Law, this article from the New Republic is a fascinating read for those interested in the history and/or business aspect of how large law firms have operated and why that model may become extinct.
Plus, they have a great picture of Bob Odenkirk in character as Saul Goodman from the AMC television series Breaking Bad. Saul is one of my favorite TV attorneys of all time. New season starts August 11. Stay tuned...
Plus, they have a great picture of Bob Odenkirk in character as Saul Goodman from the AMC television series Breaking Bad. Saul is one of my favorite TV attorneys of all time. New season starts August 11. Stay tuned...
Friday, July 12, 2013
Minnesota Strengthens Whistleblower Protections
The Minnesota legislature passed, and the Governor has signed, significant amendments to Minnesota's Whistleblower Act, which prohibits employers from, among other things, retaliating against an employee for making a good faith report of a violation or suspected violation of law.
Through a number of poor court decisions, the law had essentially been filled with so many employer-friendly loop-holes and defenses so that almost no one was protected by the law anymore.
Specifically, the bill does the following:
Through a number of poor court decisions, the law had essentially been filled with so many employer-friendly loop-holes and defenses so that almost no one was protected by the law anymore.
Specifically, the bill does the following:
- It defines a "good faith" report as one that is not knowingly false or in reckless disregard of the truth. Prior court interpretations of the term "good faith" had excluded from protection reports made as part of one's job duties or reports that did not affect some larger public policy. Those cases are now obsolete.
- It defines the term "penalize" as "conduct that might dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a report including a post-termination conduct by an employer or conduct by an employer for the benefit of a third party." Prior to this, an employer arguably had to take a much more tangible adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or a pay cut, to violate the statute. This amendment recognizes that there are numerous other ways an employer can dissuade someone from making a report and makes sure all of those actions are illegal.
- It defines a "report" as a "verbal, written, or electronic communication by an employee about an actual, suspected, or planned violation of a statute, regulation, or common law, whether committed by an employer or a third party." Previously, there was significant debate about what an employee had to do to actually "report" a violation of law. Furthermore, this provides protection to employees to report "planned" violations, not just violations after they have occurred. It also expands the types of legal violations an employee can report to violations of the common law, such as torts.
- Finally, the amendments provide protection for
public employees reporting unlawful conduct to their legislators or
constitutional officers.
U.S. Supreme Court Deals Two Blows To Employees
The U.S. Supreme Court issued two recent opinions that negatively affect the rights of every employee in Minnesota and across the country.
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the issue before the court was the standard a plaintiff needs to meet in order to prove a retaliation claim under Title VII. As you may recall, Title VII is the federal law that, among other things, prohibits discrimination and retaliation in employment based on a person's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The court was presented with the question of what standard a plaintiff had to prove in order to succeed on a claim of retaliation. A claim of retaliation typically exists when an employee complains of discrimination in the workplace and then suffers some type of adverse employment action (termination, demotion, cut in pay, etc.) as a result.
As recognized in the SCOTUS Blog, Congress and the court have had a unique "back-and-forth" about what a plaintiff has to prove to succeed on a claim brought under Title VII. Like many employment law statutes, Congress approved Title VII and the Supreme Court then began narrowly interpreting it in a series of decisions. Specifically, the court had previously held that a plaintiff need to prove that "but for" their race, color, religion, etc., they would not have suffered the adverse employment action at issue. This meant that even if a plaintiff could prove an employer's decision was based in part on an improper motive such as sex, they could still lose if the jury believed the employer would have fired them anyway.
In 1991, Congress acted and overturned those decisions. Specifically, the court adopted a "motivating factor" test that, in essence, allowed the plaintiff to prevail if she could show an improper motive was one of many "motivating factors" in the adverse employment decision.
The issue before the court in Nasser was whether the motivating factor test applied to retaliation claims. The court held that it does not. Justice Alito, writing for the 5-4 majority, stated that retaliation claims are to be decided using the "but for" analysis. Justice Ginsberg, who read her dissent in court, specifically called on Congress to overturn this decision because the court has, on numerous occasions, held that retaliation is simply another form of discrimination.
In sum, this decision makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove a claim of retaliation under federal law. Employees in Minnesota still may bring a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which applies the motivating factor test.
The second case is Vance v. Ball State University. In that case, the court further defined who constitutes a "supervisor" in claims for workplace harassment. Specifically, the court held that a supervisor is limited to someone authorized to take “tangible employment actions” like hiring, firing, promoting, demoting or reassigning employees to significantly different responsibilities. The court went on to hold that “the ability to direct another employee’s tasks is simply not sufficient” to call someone a supervisor. Limiting who constitutes a supervisor is significant because the burden to prove harassment against a supervisor is less burdensome than against a co-worker.
In the big picture, these cases materially limit employees' rights in the workplace.
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the issue before the court was the standard a plaintiff needs to meet in order to prove a retaliation claim under Title VII. As you may recall, Title VII is the federal law that, among other things, prohibits discrimination and retaliation in employment based on a person's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The court was presented with the question of what standard a plaintiff had to prove in order to succeed on a claim of retaliation. A claim of retaliation typically exists when an employee complains of discrimination in the workplace and then suffers some type of adverse employment action (termination, demotion, cut in pay, etc.) as a result.
As recognized in the SCOTUS Blog, Congress and the court have had a unique "back-and-forth" about what a plaintiff has to prove to succeed on a claim brought under Title VII. Like many employment law statutes, Congress approved Title VII and the Supreme Court then began narrowly interpreting it in a series of decisions. Specifically, the court had previously held that a plaintiff need to prove that "but for" their race, color, religion, etc., they would not have suffered the adverse employment action at issue. This meant that even if a plaintiff could prove an employer's decision was based in part on an improper motive such as sex, they could still lose if the jury believed the employer would have fired them anyway.
In 1991, Congress acted and overturned those decisions. Specifically, the court adopted a "motivating factor" test that, in essence, allowed the plaintiff to prevail if she could show an improper motive was one of many "motivating factors" in the adverse employment decision.
The issue before the court in Nasser was whether the motivating factor test applied to retaliation claims. The court held that it does not. Justice Alito, writing for the 5-4 majority, stated that retaliation claims are to be decided using the "but for" analysis. Justice Ginsberg, who read her dissent in court, specifically called on Congress to overturn this decision because the court has, on numerous occasions, held that retaliation is simply another form of discrimination.
In sum, this decision makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove a claim of retaliation under federal law. Employees in Minnesota still may bring a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which applies the motivating factor test.
The second case is Vance v. Ball State University. In that case, the court further defined who constitutes a "supervisor" in claims for workplace harassment. Specifically, the court held that a supervisor is limited to someone authorized to take “tangible employment actions” like hiring, firing, promoting, demoting or reassigning employees to significantly different responsibilities. The court went on to hold that “the ability to direct another employee’s tasks is simply not sufficient” to call someone a supervisor. Limiting who constitutes a supervisor is significant because the burden to prove harassment against a supervisor is less burdensome than against a co-worker.
In the big picture, these cases materially limit employees' rights in the workplace.
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